I examine the three most prominent examples of recent terrorism, and conclude that they lack any justification. In extreme instances where justification might be possible, there is no terrorism. I argue (1) that we need to confront the overwhelming force of mass illusions that lead to terrorism and its support; (2) that the belief, encouraged by the international laws of warfare, that terrorism is never justified, might be a "positive illusion"; and (3) of the dangers of the belief that we should permit terrorism in the fight by the weak against oppression.

In 'Mind' of January 1996 I proposed an outline of a theory of responsibility and desert, which I claimed both a) enables us to see responsibility as a condition for desert even in the major apparent counter-examples such as those proposed by Fred Feldman; and b) represents the ordinary way of seeing the connection between responsibility and desert better than previous formulations. Behind this proposal lies a crucial distinction between 'two ways' in which responsibility can be a condition for desert. From Feldman's reply in the same issue it seems that this crucial distinction was not sufficiently brought out in my paper. This I attempt to do here.

I argue that there exist duties that can be called "Moral duties due to history" or, shorter, "Duties to History" (DTH). My claim is not the familiar claim that we need to learn from history how to live better in the present and towards the future, but that history itself creates moral duties. There exist special obligations in response to the past; in addition to those obligations we currently recognise to the present and the future. If convincing, this means that our lives ought to be guided, in part, not only by our obligations to the living but by the DTH. This is a surprising result, with significant and sometimes perplexing implications. My focus will be on the obligations of individuals in the light of history rather than on collective duties.

The nonidentity problem (henceforth NIP) is one of the great moral discoveries of the 20th century; and a philosophical classic. It is a single, simple, powerful, philosophical conundrum. It has in many cases a solution, but cannot be dismissed, and retains its paradoxical force. I will aim to present my own take on it, and defend the NIP from the original and challenging attack by Melinda Roberts and David Wasserman in "Dividing and Conquering the Nonidentity Problem" (this volume). In the process, I will reject the positions they offer on each of the two alleged problems into which they divide the NIP, offering some less familiar arguments, particularly about individual contribution and the special role of parenting. I will also explicate why I think that it is in any case a mistake to see the NIP as composed of two distinct problems, showing both its unity and the broadness of its manifestations; illustrate how my recent "historical" exploration of this problem is helpful; and will conclude by defending the idea that the nonidentity problem typically has a solution but is nevertheless a large and significant problem, an "existential paradox".

In "The Paradox of Moral Complaint" I took up the question whether a person who has wronged others in certain ways may morally complain if other people then harm him illegitimately in similar ways. I argued that there are strong grounds for saying both 'yes' and 'no' here and, therefore, that our considered moral views are paradoxical. In her reply, Talia Shaham disagrees with the no part of my position. She presents two appealing philosophical arguments, and concludes that there is no 'paradox of moral complaint', seeking in particular to defend the unconditional moral 'right' of wronged wrongdoers to complain, as against my claims. I attempt to defend my position against her arguments.

In "The Paradox of Moral Complaint" I took up the question whether a person who has wronged others in certain ways may morally complain if other people then harm him illegitimately in similar ways. I argued that there are strong grounds for saying both 'yes' and 'no' here and, therefore, that our considered moral views are paradoxical. In her reply, Talia Shaham disagrees with the no part of my position. She presents two appealing philosophical arguments, and concludes that there is no 'paradox of moral complaint', seeking in particular to defend the unconditional moral 'right' of wronged wrongdoers to complain, as against my claims. I attempt to defend my position against her arguments.

Anti-utilitarians have argued about the issue of utilitarianism and the 'punishment' of the innocent by presenting extreme and peripheral examples, allowing utilitarians to disclaim the reality of the problem. Both sides have shared the opinion that in daily life utilitarianism will not entail much (if any) 'punishment' of the innocent. I argue that this is a mistake. If we consider not specific detailed examples (or the total transformation of society) but the utilitarian attractions of a limited relaxation of the rigorous criteria within the current judicial framework, the opposition between utility and justice is clear.

I argue that utilitarianism has serious difficulties in accommodating the central human need of maintaining one's identity, over a long period of time. There is no clear reason in utilitarian terms for remaining oneself, and there might well be good reason for transforming oneself into someone else. If my arguments are convincing being a utilitarian becomes, if not incoherent, then at least very unattractive for most human beings.

TBA