People do good or bad things and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.

Cynicism has a bad reputation. The cynic is not only after teaching us something new about morality, but seeks to unmask it, claiming that it derives from illicit and undeclared motivations. I explore whether there is anything we can learn from cynicism about morality, particularly about the content of morality. I distinguish between three basic forms of skepticism and the parallel forms of cynicism. I then examine four examples of suggestive ethical cynicism. Finally, I try to see in which areas ethical cynicism is likely to be more enlightening.

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Hard determinism is commonly thought to have grave moral consequences. Without attempting to fully deny this, I explore a previously unnoticed apparent ethical advantage of a belief in hard determinism. The lack of concern with personal desert which accompanies belief in hard determinism seems to make possible a form of purer morality' than ordinary morality. In the process I briefly consider some perplexities of Kantianism, the personal' difficulty of being a hard determinist, and the question as to whether non- utilitarian ethical considerations are possible with hard determinist premises.

I argue that William James indulged in self-deception with regard to the free will problem. My argument differs from previous ones in two ways: firstly, in pointing out specific features of James's philosophical writing with indicate the self-deception. Secondly, in presenting an integrated case, based not only on the much discussed issue of his "Will to Believe" position, but on James's autobiographical writing as well as on specific features of his philosophical writing. The conclusion is said to cast doubts about the "Will to Believe" position. Finally, I briefly consider the general issue of philosophical self-deception.

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