I argue that William James indulged in self-deception with regard to the free will problem. My argument differs from previous ones in two ways: firstly, in pointing out specific features of James's philosophical writing with indicate the self-deception. Secondly, in presenting an integrated case, based not only on the much discussed issue of his "Will to Believe" position, but on James's autobiographical writing as well as on specific features of his philosophical writing. The conclusion is said to cast doubts about the "Will to Believe" position. Finally, I briefly consider the general issue of philosophical self-deception.

Widespread and deep intuitions about the basic content of any satisfactory theory for justifying punishment, together with some plausible empirical assumptions, are seen to yield two closely related paradoxes about justice and the severity of punishment. Considerations of desert point in the opposite direction than do considerations of deterrence with regard to the severity of punishment of the underprivileged. And this leads to a situation in which, if considerations of the desert of the underprivileged are taken seriously, the convicted from privileged backgrounds are to be more severely punished, unnecessarily'.

The question whether libertarian free will is 'worth wanting' was emphasized (and given a negative answer) by Dennett in his recent Elbow Room. I argue that this question is seriously ambiguous, and includes two different sorts of questions, which I attempt to elucidate. I then go on to argue that once the two questions are clearly perceived, the compatibilist case is hardly as strong. Even if libertarian free will is impossible (and is thus in one sense 'not worth wanting'), in another sense libertarian free will is 'worth wanting'.

Anti-utilitarians have argued about the issue of utilitarianism and the 'punishment' of the innocent by presenting extreme and peripheral examples, allowing utilitarians to disclaim the reality of the problem. Both sides have shared the opinion that in daily life utilitarianism will not entail much (if any) 'punishment' of the innocent. I argue that this is a mistake. If we consider not specific detailed examples (or the total transformation of society) but the utilitarian attractions of a limited relaxation of the rigorous criteria within the current judicial framework, the opposition between utility and justice is clear.

The paper points out a crucial difficulty in Van Inwagen's An Essay on Free Will--his claim for the direct obviousness of the existence of libertarian moral responsibility. Van Inwagen's attempt to discredit the beliefs of the people who doubt the existence of libertarian moral responsibility is shown not to succeed. And since virtually all of Van Inwagen's case for the existence of libertarian free will depends on his case for the "obviousness" of libertarian moral responsibility, the failure of the latter undermines the former.

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