'Reactive-contribution' is the contribution we make by benefiting from the contributions of others. By reacting to contributions we make them greater and this, in turn, is also a contribution. Recognizing this form of contribution has the potential to broaden our view of morality. Various complexities and objections are considered.

This paper presents, in outline, a novel position on the issue of free will and compares this position to other more familiar positions. The position I defend consists of two proposals, summarizing the main claims that I make in my book 'Free Will and Illusion' (Oxford University Press, 2000). The first proposal is a 'fundamental dualism' according to which we have to be both compatibilists and hard determinists, and must attempt to combine the assumptions of both positions. The second proposal, 'illusionism', claims that illusion on free will is morally necessary.

I attempt to sketch in general terms an alternative moral perspective that goes beyond the traditional normative theories, a moral perspective called ?contributivism?. This focuses on contribution: caring about one's contribution, I claim, lies at the centre of moral cncern. First I illustrate the need for a contribution-focussed moral theory, primarily by considering gratitude, the typical required response to altruism. Second, I point out some of the motivational resources of such a contribution-based view. I conclude by showing how focusing on contributions can uncover neglected areas of moral significance, which both broaden our recognition of altruistic behavious, and raise questions concerning the moral centrality of altruism

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Sir Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" was a landmark in the philosophical understanding of the free will problem. Building upon it, I attempt to defend a novel position, which purports to provide, in outline, the next step forward. The position presented is based on the descriptively central and normatively crucial role of illusion in the issue of free will. Illusion, I claim, is the vital but neglected 'key' to the free will problem. The proposed position, which may be called 'Illusionism', is shown to follow both from the strengths and from the weaknesses of Strawson's position.

I consider an old and forceful argument that often features in discourse on the free will problem, but of which there has not been any thorough discussion. According to the free will "Turn-Around" Argument, the idea that one may not be accountable for one's actions is turned in upon itself, such that treating as accountable also becomes something for which no one can be held accountable. The "Turn-Around" Argument is, at least rhetorically, a very effective weapon against attempts at escaping moral accountability. However, neither its nature nor its strengths are straightforward as they may first seem.

In the following essay, I attempt to defend a novel position on 'the free will problem'. In particular, I intend to provide (in outline) a position based on the descriptively central and normatively crucial role of illusion in the free will issue. Illusion, I claim, is the vital but neglected key to the free will problem. The proposed position, which can be called 'Illusionism', can be defended independently from its derivation from P.F. Strawson's 'reactive-naturalism'. (edited)

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Recent political philosophy has tended to neglect and discount the free will issue and this attitude has had important consequences, since the implications of the free will issue have a profound significance for our understanding of issues such as distributive justice. By discussing what I take to be the most intuitively coherent form that egalitarianism has taken, G.A. Cohen's, I attempt to show the crucial importance of the free will issue for the egalitarian agenda.

People do good or bad things and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.

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Getting people not to harm others is a central goal of morality. But while it is commonly perceived that those who benefit others merit gratitude, those who do not harm others are not ordinarily thought to merit anything. I attempt to argue against this, claiming that all the arguments against gratitude to the non-maleficent are unsuccessful. Finally, I ex- plore the difference it would make if we thought that we owe gratitude to those who do not harm us