Failure has not been, as far as I know, philosophically analyzed in detail. I analyze three distinct kinds or ways of failure, and the relationship among them. I focus on prudential failure in what one has done or not done, in major aspects of one's life, such as romantic love and work. This exploration seems to shed new light on the notion of failure and on its complexity. The discussion has clear practical application, once we are clear about the three distinct kinds, in helping us to weigh our different interests in not failing, as well as our failure-related fears, against each other.

Widespread and deep intuitions about the basic content of any satisfactory theory for justifying punishment, together with some plausible empirical assumptions, are seen to yield two closely related paradoxes about justice and the severity of punishment. Considerations of desert point in the opposite direction than do considerations of deterrence with regard to the severity of punishment of the underprivileged. And this leads to a situation in which, if considerations of the desert of the underprivileged are taken seriously, the convicted from privileged backgrounds are to be more severely punished, unnecessarily'.

Anti-utilitarians have argued about the issue of utilitarianism and the 'punishment' of the innocent by presenting extreme and peripheral examples, allowing utilitarians to disclaim the reality of the problem. Both sides have shared the opinion that in daily life utilitarianism will not entail much (if any) 'punishment' of the innocent. I argue that this is a mistake. If we consider not specific detailed examples (or the total transformation of society) but the utilitarian attractions of a limited relaxation of the rigorous criteria within the current judicial framework, the opposition between utility and justice is clear.

The paper points out a crucial difficulty in Van Inwagen's An Essay on Free Will--his claim for the direct obviousness of the existence of libertarian moral responsibility. Van Inwagen's attempt to discredit the beliefs of the people who doubt the existence of libertarian moral responsibility is shown not to succeed. And since virtually all of Van Inwagen's case for the existence of libertarian free will depends on his case for the "obviousness" of libertarian moral responsibility, the failure of the latter undermines the former.

Many people find themselves ruminating on the existence of others, and wishing that they had not been born. This may come about innocently enough, as when one is stuck in traffic and laments that there are so many other drivers on the road to where one is intending to go; but also exists in more ominous form, when people wish that whole groups had not been born or, at least, had not been in one’s vicinity: the poor or the rich, immigrants or locals, people of a certain ethnicity or religion. I call these thoughts "preferences for others' nonexistence" (PON). I show that the Nonidentity problem or effect by and large excludes PON thoughts, showing them to be (given plausible assumptions) irrational, and indeed self-defeating. The self is held hostage by the other. We come to exist together, or not at all.

I describe a case involving two countries at war, Benevolentia and Malevoran. Malevoran is an unjust aggressor, which does not follow the requirements of the prevailing morality of warfare. The leadership and army of Benevolentia closely follow those requirements, and as a direct result Benevolentia loses. I claim that this is a 'reductio' of the prevailing morality of warfare: in the victory of Malevoran over Benevolentia morality has lost. I draw some tentative conclusions concerning the morality of warfare, and urge that we need to gain a richer understanding of what it means for morality to win, see this as a distinct and important moral consideration, and think afresh how morality can triumph much more often.

I argue that utilitarianism has serious difficulties in accommodating the central human need of maintaining one's identity, over a long period of time. There is no clear reason in utilitarian terms for remaining oneself, and there might well be good reason for transforming oneself into someone else. If my arguments are convincing being a utilitarian becomes, if not incoherent, then at least very unattractive for most human beings.

"Teflon immorality'' (or TI) is immorality that goes on unchecked -- the wrongdoing is not stopped and its perpetrators, beyond the reach of punishment or other sanction, often persist in their immoral ways. The idea that the immoral prosper has been recognized as morally (and legally) disturbing presumably for as long as humanity has been reflective, and can be found already in the Bible. The reasons behind a great deal of successful immorality are important practically, but uninteresting philosophically. Sometimes, however, we face events that are more interesting philosophically, and Teflon immorality results from oddities such as moral paradoxes and perversions. These, however, have remained largely unnoticed. I will outline a tentative survey of this topic. After showing its pervasiveness and importance, I will briefly reflect on its relevance to the way we should think about morality and about the means to further it, and confront possible objections.

TBA