I summarize the main points of my book 'Free Will and Illusion' (Oxford University Press, 2000). In part I of the book I examine the metaphysical and ethical structure of the free-will problem, examining the solutions that have traditionally been offered and formulating my own position. This lays the groundwork for examining the role of illusion, in part II. In the book I offer two radical proposals for understanding the implications of living in a world without libertarian free will (such as a deterministic world): first, the attempt to combine the two central rival alternatives, compatibilism and hard determinism. The partial but valid insights of both positions need to be integrated into a hybrid view, which I call "fundamental dualism." Secondly, I examine in some detail the complex role of illusion in our lives, insofar as they are affected by the issue of free will. (edited)

In part I, I reflect in some detail upon the free will problem and about the way its understanding has radically changed. First, I outline the four questions that go into making the free will problem. Second, I consider four paradigmatic shifts that have occurred in our understanding of this problem. Then I go on to reflect upon this complex and multilevel situation. In part II of this essay, I explore the major alternative positions, and defend my views, in new ways. Instead of trying to spread over many issues, I present one new argument against compatibilism, which I call "the trap". This tries to explicate the main problem that I find with this position. Then I present an exposition of what we nevertheless need to follow, which I call "the appreciation of agency". This supports a measure of compatibilism in a more modest form, and opposes hard determinism. On this basis, we can confront the philosophical and practical questions, as to what we ought to believe and how we ought to live, with respect to free will and moral responsibility. This leads to what I call "the bubble," which addresses the way in which we deal with the tension between the absence of libertarian free will and "the trap", and the crucial need for the "appreciation of agency". I conclude by reflecting upon three attributes of the free will problem that I consider central, but that have been neglected in the debate: complexity, risk and tragedy.

I argue that the free will problem is essentially about respect for persons, and draw out some compatibilist and incompatibilist implications.

I consider an old and forceful argument that often features in discourse on the free will problem, but of which there has not been any thorough discussion. According to the free will "Turn-Around" Argument, the idea that one may not be accountable for one's actions is turned in upon itself, such that treating as accountable also becomes something for which no one can be held accountable. The "Turn-Around" Argument is, at least rhetorically, a very effective weapon against attempts at escaping moral accountability. However, neither its nature nor its strengths are straightforward as they may first seem.

In the last twenty years much philosophical progress has been made in understanding what can be named the "mystery of modesty": how can an epistemically adequate self-evaluation by the admirable and accomplished nevertheless be both genuinely modest and a virtue? If the admirable and accomplished know their value, how then can they be modest about it? If they do not know their value, how can this be a virtue? Various proposals have been formulated, but after reviewing them I conclude that they do not seem to be successful. I argue, nevertheless, that we can make sense of the virtue of modesty, if only we pay adequate attention to the implications of the problem of free will. This, if properly interpreted, is the key to the mystery of modesty.

I introduce the term �crazy ethics� (or CE), which I use in a semi-descriptive and non-pejorative way to refer to some views that we ourselves hold, or that we think might be true. I claim that some true ethical views are, in this interesting sense, crazy. After explicating what makes such views crazy, I explore the free will problem and show why viewing it as a case of CE is fruitful. I show that many of the prevailing positions in the debate are "crazy" in this sense, and that the views I hold to be most plausible are also so. I then reflect on what this means, particularly for morality, personal and social integrity, and the role of philosophy.

I have argued that discussions of distributive justice, and in particular choice-based egalitarian ones, need to take much more seriously than they do the dreaded free will problem. Sung-Hak Kang challenges my views. His two main claims are, first, that putting metaphysical issues such as the free will problem as posterior to ethics are mistaken. Second, that a realistic, moderate egalitarianism has better prospects with John Rawls's "nonmetaphysical" orientation than with any free will-dependent one. I reply.

This paper presents, in outline, a novel position on the issue of free will and compares this position to other more familiar positions. The position I defend consists of two proposals, summarizing the main claims that I make in my book 'Free Will and Illusion' (Oxford University Press, 2000). The first proposal is a 'fundamental dualism' according to which we have to be both compatibilists and hard determinists, and must attempt to combine the assumptions of both positions. The second proposal, 'illusionism', claims that illusion on free will is morally necessary.

Sir Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" was a landmark in the philosophical understanding of the free will problem. Building upon it, I attempt to defend a novel position, which purports to provide, in outline, the next step forward. The position presented is based on the descriptively central and normatively crucial role of illusion in the issue of free will. Illusion, I claim, is the vital but neglected 'key' to the free will problem. The proposed position, which may be called 'Illusionism', is shown to follow both from the strengths and from the weaknesses of Strawson's position.

The free-will debate is characterized by an effort to see the bright side of things. This feature is shared by almost all participants, irrespective of their other disagreements. We are not self-critical enough about this (natural) tendency. There is some good news, even if we don't have libertarian free will. But in different ways, the free will issue is very bad news. I illustrate this, and discuss what it implies.

In the following essay, I attempt to defend a novel position on 'the free will problem'. In particular, I intend to provide (in outline) a position based on the descriptively central and normatively crucial role of illusion in the free will issue. Illusion, I claim, is the vital but neglected key to the free will problem. The proposed position, which can be called 'Illusionism', can be defended independently from its derivation from P.F. Strawson's 'reactive-naturalism'. (edited)

I attempt to sketch in general terms an alternative moral perspective that goes beyond the traditional normative theories, a moral perspective called ?contributivism?. This focuses on contribution: caring about one's contribution, I claim, lies at the centre of moral cncern. First I illustrate the need for a contribution-focussed moral theory, primarily by considering gratitude, the typical required response to altruism. Second, I point out some of the motivational resources of such a contribution-based view. I conclude by showing how focusing on contributions can uncover neglected areas of moral significance, which both broaden our recognition of altruistic behavious, and raise questions concerning the moral centrality of altruism